## - Dr. Shivani Sharma Angiras

The problem of universals being an epistemological problem of the relation of thought to reality drives us to a conclusion that knowledge may be divided into sensuous and conceptual at the very ground-level. The former is a representation of an object in its concrete and particular aspect whereas the latter presents the same without any note of particularity. The objects outside the mind, as presented by sensuous knowledge, are particulars and our concepts of them are general or universal. Such an intimate relation between the universals and the particulars leads us to a bare minimum assumption that the two are known because of the relation they share for their representation externally. It has been established that the relation between the two is of Samvaya for Nyaaya and Bhedabheda for Mimamsakas (Prabhakar). The aim of the paper is to explore a debate on the nature of knowledge that we derive of Samanya padartha in Vaisheshika's terms, Jati in Naiyaayika's context and Akriti in Mimasakas perspective. Though an explicit aim would be to highlight the apparent differences between the two schools yet at the same time it would also be the concern to unfold their reasons for assumptions behind their doctrines.

Following reflections are the foundations of further inquiry in the present attempt.

What is meant by Indriyartha Sannikarsha? Whether the contact of Samyukta Samveta Samvaya is the source of the perception of the Universal or Jati.

To focus on the concept of Vyakti-Jati-Akriti as the source of knowledge of universals residing or abiding in the particulars.

If at all, Akriti is an appendix to the concept of Jati?

Does objective reality correspond to the universal concepts in mind or if "Samanya vishesha iti buddhyapeksham" is to be interpreted as that Universals and Particulars are nothing but thought constructions.

Whether the relation of Samvaya or of Bhedabheda justifies the assumptions of universals inhering in their respective particulars or if the two are identical.

To highlight the limitations of the thought that cognition of universal and the individual are, if of, identity or of difference.

Whether the universal is absolutely different from the individuality of a thing, if so how do they co-exist in the same substratum?

There are different reactions from the classical schools of Indian philosophy on the acceptance or modified versions of Jati or Universals and to the question if universals are simply creation of mind and thought? How universals are possible? If they are not accepted as real how are we suppose to account any rational explanation of knowledge that transcends the limits of historicity .

According to **Buddhists** there are no universals in the outside world and thus they are conceptual constructs or Apoha. It is maintained by them that the universals are only words and they are made universals by being used by a number of different particulars. Reality is the constituted of momentary particulars which are absolutely discrete and unique point-instants or the Svalakshanas. These Svalakshanas are given to us as pure sensation where as the universals or Samanyalakshanas are given to us by the understanding as an innate constructive tendency or Anadividyavasna. The reality viewed as Paramartha and Samrvriti, conceptual knowledge is not absolutely bereft of value and thus has practical value though ultimately illusory.

The universal and the particular are not two realities but related aspects of one and the same complex reality. The two are relatively different and relatively identical is the position upheld by the **Jainas**. The objective basis of universal concepts is not identity but Sadrishparinama or similarity of development. Thus, Samanya is not an identical feature common to different particulars but similarity is in different particulars. For some like Abhayadevasuri, Samannya is neither an identity nor a similarity but a 'subjective construction' having no reality.

Advaitins recognize the necessity for assuming the grounds of universal concepts but they differ from Nyaya school in postulating plurality of universals. Satta or universal Existence, if be admitted, serves as the basis of all other classes of universals. Jati, for Advaitins is replaced by the concept of Nama-Rupa as all universals are nothing but appearances of the eternal Existence (Satta) because of Avidya. The Samanya is the limited empirical substratum for particular to appear as Being is the Ashraya for all the worldly appearances.

**Mimamsa** introduces Universals by establishing that "Vyakti akriti jatyastu padarthah". It is further added that a structure of an object's parts and further parts

of the parts in a definite form is Akriti "Sattvavayavanam tadavayavnam ca niyato vyuh akrtih.." Akriti acts as a cause of our cognitions and this is why a definite-form of a cow or a horse is known the same way as it is. Mimamsakas, however object to the Jativadins that it is only through the Akriti that Jati gets manifested, "Ya sabda samuha tyaga parigraha, sankhyaa vriddhi apacaya, samasa anubandhanam vyaktavupacaradvyaktih".

However, what the Naiyaayikas add as a footnote to the concept of Akriti is "Jati lingakhya" i.e. one by which class and gender is manifested. "Jatimevakrtim prahurvyaktirakriyate yaya samanyam tacca pindanamekabuddhi nibandhanaam"<sup>4</sup> the verse allows us to interpret that Akrti is one through which individual gets stated whereas commonness apprehended by our mind among different objects is Jati. This further leads the Mimamsakas to accept that our cognition is a combination of specifying features and commonness among objects. Akriti for Kumarila is though physical manifestation also called configuration yet is not to be equated with only physical appearances of the objects as there are classes of things like fire, air, sound etc. which have no physical existence<sup>5</sup>, Akriti as a configuration being different individuals is not a common character<sup>6</sup> again configuration being subject to destruction can not be Jati or universal which is eternal<sup>7</sup>. Kumarila very carefully demarcates universal from Sarupta or similarity when he states that if there were no universals but only similarities, then on perceiving two cows, we could only say that they are similar and not that the two belong to the same class of 'cows'. The knowledge of the two cows is in the form of 'this is the same as that' and not 'this is similar to that'. Thus, identity is considered to be the base of universal and not similarity.

Total and partial subsistence of universals in their respective particulars has been another related issue to which Kumarila claims to be illegitimate as it cannot

<sup>2</sup> Nyaya Sutras 2.2.67

6 71.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Nyaya Sutras, 2.259

Slokavartika of Kumarila, ed. Dr. Kunhan Raja, Madras University, Press, 1946, Akritivada, 25.3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Akritjatirevatra sansthananaam na parkalpyate na hi vayvagnisabdadu kimchid sansthanamisyate,Sloka vartika, Vanvadah. 16, ed. Dwarkadas Shastri, p.438.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Anyadanyacca Sansthanam Pratipindam Pratiyate Samyougatmakatayam tu vibhageshu vinashyati, Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Slokavartika, Akrti.3, Vanvada, 33-35

be raised in the respect of universals which are impartite and since the universal is cognized as subsisting in numerous individuals leaves no room for any further questioning<sup>8</sup>. A similar rejection regarding the partial or wholistic subsistence of universal is remarked as illegitimate from Udyotkara as the universal is not a composite entity possessing further parts. To consider universal subsisting wholly amounts to say that there are many universals subsisting in many particulars and to hold universal's partial subsistence in particulars amounts to say that many partial universals subsist in many particulars. Thus, both the approaches would end up in a contradiction<sup>9</sup> It is to be noted here the impact of self-validity of knowledge leads the Mimamsakas to conclude that a perceptual fact must be admitted to be self-valid and therefore, does not need any further validation by another perceptual fact as the process would lead to infinite regression.

The major difference between Nyaaya and Mimamsakas lies in their theory of the mode of existence of the relation between Universal and the Particular. For the former it is of inherence and for the latter it is Svabhavikashaca sambandho jatirvyaktyor na hetuman<sup>10</sup> i.e. it is one of purely a natural or internal one and is not based on anything external to them. In other words, it is of Tadatmya. This leads us to conclude that when individuals are cognized in their class-nature, they are to be apprehended as identical and when the universal is cognized in its individual instances, they are apprehended as different.

**Nyaaya** holds the Universal to be absolutely different from the particular and it is not found separately because it is inseparably related with the latter by the relation of Samvaya or inherence. Samvaya is defined by the Nyaaya as a relation generating the idea of constitutive locus with regard to inseparable things (Ayutasiddhanam ihapratyaya hetuh). The idea of Ayutasiddhi has been scrutinized by Parthasarthi<sup>11</sup>as **follows-**

Our knowledge of 'cow' is of the form of 'this is cow' and not 'this has cowness' that amounts to question Samvaya in the mode of loci.

Does being Ayutta means absence of separate existence?

If so, it can be understood either as Prthaggatimatva (separate movements) or Prathagashrayaitya (separate substratum)?

Nyaaya Vartika Tatparya Tika, Vacaspati MisraRajeshwara Shastri Dravida,1925, p.477

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Slokavartia, Akrti, 31; ed. Dr. Kunhan Raja, Madras University Press, 1946.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Shastradipika, Vidya Vilas Press, Kashi, 1907, p.30.

Manmeyodaya, Narayana, 3.4, Theosophical Publication House, Adyar, Madras, 1993, p.291.

If so, then the relation between the part and the whole cannot be one of Samvaya as parts would move even when the whole does not move or the whole or the parts have different substrates.

The objection visualized by the Mimamsakas, therefore, is if the relation i.e. Samvaya is non-different from its relata there is no relation and if it is different there is infinite regress<sup>12</sup>. In such a state, in the view of Mimamsa school there is an impossibility of relation between the universal and the particular. The complication between the two is dissolvable according to Parthasarthi Misra, if Samvaya is redefined as the relation by which Adheya (attribute) generates the knowledge of its on Adhara (substratum). This amounts to claim that Universal is both identical with and different from the individual. But this has lead to several counter arguments and contradictions, mainly as that if the individual and the universal are regarded as absolutely identical then one of them would be unreal and if they are regarded as absolutely different then we can not explain as to why 'cow-ness' subsists only in cows and not in horses<sup>13</sup>. Again, if the two i.e. the Universal and the Particular are absolutely identical then the subject and the predicate terms of the judgment 'this is cow' would become synonymous. And, if the two are different then our perceptual judgment could not be 'this is cow' but should be as 'this' and 'cow-ness'14.

Prabhakara too establishes Akriti/Jati to be different from its mode of appearance when it is claimed that "Jatir ashrayato bhinna pratyakshajnana gocarah; Purvakaravamarshena Prabhakaragurormata" Perception due to repetition of the 'same-form' helps us to assume Jati. His difference from Nyaaya-Vaisheshika is on the relation of Samvaya being non-eternal than eternal<sup>16</sup>. To be non-eternal, for Naiyaayikas is to have a cause, Samvayi, Asamavayi or Nimitta. Samvaya can not have either of the first two as both presuppose its existence and therefore, Samvaya cannot be said to be non-eternal. Whereas the two kinds of Samvaya has been propounded by the Mimasakas as Nitya and Anitya explaining that the Samvaya between two eternal things as that between Akasha and it Mahatva or magnitude is eternal and so far Samvaya between the two non-eternal things as between whole and parts, eternal and non-eternal, universal and individual is concerned it is non-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Nanu samanyam vyakteratyantamabhinnam bhinnam va..napi bhinnam, goreva...jatijatimatorabhedabhedasamucca..., Manameyodaya of Narayana, 5,3.5, ed.

Kunhan Raja, Theosophical Publication House, Adyar, Madras, 1993, p.233-34.

Prakaran Panchika of Shaliknath with Nyaayasiddhi, ed. By Subramanya Sasri, Banaras Hindu University, 1961, p 64

Ibid,p.91

eternal. Thus, Samvaya in the later case becomes more of a relation of conjunction for them<sup>17</sup>.

Another objection of Prabhakar against Naiyaayikas standpoint of eternality of the relation between the universal and the particular then the former should be perceived even after the latter is destroyed. "Nayati na ca tatrasidatasti pashcanna cansvat jahati purvam nadharmaho vyasanasantatih" i.e. it does not come, it was not there and it is there afterwards and it has no parts. It does not quit its earlier abode. Alas, what a string of difficulties. The fact that it is not perceived proves that the relation between the two is non-eternal.

Mimasaka's perspective on the concept of Samvaya directs them to derive the theory of Bhedabheda. The theory of Bhedabheda upholds that the unique relation of universal and particular is neither based on absolute identity nor on absolute difference but on identity-in-difference. The question of concern is in which respect they are identical and in which respect they are different? The reading of Kumarila's perspective seems to suggest that the individual is identical with the universal as universal and is different from it as the individual. The idea of 'constitutive locus' or 'ihapratyaya' in Samvaya provides the grounds of Dharma-Dharmi relation between the attributes and the substance. The cognition of Universal is possible because of such linguistic expressions as 'Ghata Ghatatvam'or pot has potness or 'Iha Gavi Gotvam' (cowness is in the cow). As per our experiences of life if an object reveals its individuality by differentiating itself from the other it is different and if an object appears to reveal its identity with its attributes or vice-versa then it is to be accepted a Abhinna or identical. As suggested by Salikanatha, "Abhinnakarabuddhibodhyam hi vastu abhinnamiti laukikah manyante, Vilakshana kara bodhavishayashca bhinnamiti"20.

For Salikanatha there seems to be no two separate cognitions of the substance and the attributes and only later one is found to be in the other. But this does not stand correct in the case of cognition of universals as we cognize the two together. It the two are identical, then on perception of an object from far should reveal even

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ibid.p.92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Manameyodaya, p.235)

<sup>&</sup>quot;Abheda ca dharmadharminorduradurataya grahane patvapatuni kutah?... Dharmigrahe ca tadabhinnama sarvesameva grahat tathatva sambhavah.." Udayanacharya, Atmatattvaviveka, Shankarmisra, Bhagirath Thakur and Raghunath Shiromani Tika, ed. Vindhyeshvari Prasad Dvivedi, Asiatic Society, Calcutta, 1986, p.730

Prakarana Panchika of Salikantha with Nyayasidhi, ed. Subrahmanya Sastri, B.H.U, 1961, p.71.

those characteristics of the object which are perceived when perceived from a closer range. The rationale of Bhedabheda is probably in the interpretation of the relation of Samvaya among the individual and the universal. For Salikanatha, Samavaya must be distinguished from the relation of contained and the container as there can be no congnition of the universal as 'contained' in the individual<sup>21</sup>. Therefore, individual is related to the universal as a substratum to a quality and the relation between the two is not to be considered as that of Adharadheya<sup>22</sup>. Precisely, the view suggests that the two objects are different in at least one of their aspects. Absence of Vyavartaka-dharma helps us to differentiate between the two and thus, Abheda or identiy comes to us through negation or Abhava.<sup>23</sup>

To conclude, Firstly, it can be observed that the Nyaaya system of thought accepts word (Pada) as the source of Vyakti, Jati and Akrti. The individual differs from the rest of the two in the sense that which is the substratum of the attributes and that which is perceptible is an individual "Vyaktirgunavisheshashrayo murtih"24. Jati is said to be "Samaanprasavatmika Jatih"25.e. that which is known even while residing or subsisting in different individuals. Akrti is considered as the configuration and is considered to be "Akrtirjati lingakhya" 26. The term or Pada 'cow' when used in different linguistic expression like- the cow grazes, the herd of cow is sitting, make the cow eat, or giving cow in alms is good are such uses of language that does not allow us to interpret the term or pada cow as Akrti but as Vyakti. The difficulty would be as to how do we differentiate here which cow or an individual is to be taken into consideration and which is to be not. Thus, the term 'cow' is an individual over-ridded by the principle of configuration or Akrti. Whereas linguistic usage, in the context of a mud-made-cow, as 'bathe the cow' does not lead the knower to a perception of 'cow' as Akrti or Vyakti as a mudmade-cow does not have 'cow-ness' as suggested by the verse "Vyaktyakritiyukte api aprasangat prokshanaadinaam mridgavake jatih". Therefore, Pada or a word manifests the three i.e. vyakti, akrti and jati.

<sup>24</sup> N.S. 2.2.66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Solkavartika, VII,ii,26-28, ed.Dr.Kunhan Raja, Madras University, Press, 1946. Prakaran Panchika, p.94.

Vilakshanakarabuddhi vedyatvasyaiva, bhedalakshanatvat, anyatha bhedabhedavyavasthanupapatteh, Prashastpada Bhashya with Sridhara's Nyaayakandali, ed. Vindhyeshwari Prasad Dwivedi, V.S.S Banaras, 1895, p.39

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> N.S. 2..264.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> N.S. 2.2.65

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Vaisheshika Sutra with Upaskar by SankarMisra and Vivrtti by Jayanarayan's

**Secondly**, Universal according to Kanada may be viewed as a general or a particular feature. In other words, the concept of Universal has a coordinative and differentiative feature that is relative to thought for which it is remarked to be Buddhyapeksham<sup>27</sup>. So far 'cowness' differentiates itself from other classes Universal as a principle of differentia has a particular effect and if it is viewed as the basis of unity and synthesis of all cow it provides the basis of generality.

Thirdly, to the question if the universal is exclusively different from its individual and to the problem of their co-existence and yet to another question if there is absolute difference and this difference is no-bar to their co-existence then why do 'cowness' and 'horseness' not co-exist? It has been argued that the ultimate nature of things as discovered in our un-contradicted experiences are unquestionable. The 'cow-ness' is perceived with the individuality of the cows and not with the 'horse-ness'.

Nyaaya recognizes characteristics of objects that are not based on universal and for this they differentiate Jati from Upadhi. If Jati is said to be the essential classnature of things, inseparable from them, such as the cow-ness of the cow, then Upadhi is any other general characteristic that is adventurous as tallness, blindness, cookness etc. "Svasamipa vartini svakiyam rupamadadhati iti upadhi". Upadhi in another way is a Jati Badhaka or a factor that obstructs an object to have a universalclass. For example, 1. Vyakterabheda i.e. character belonging to a single thing like Akashatva; 2. Tulyatva, i.e. two general names possessing the same meaning as in the case of Ghatatva and Kalashatva must not be interpreted as having two separate classes; 3. Samkarah i.e. cross dividing characters that which co-exist yet exclude one another e.g. Bhutatva (being an element) and Murtatva (having limited dimension) are present in the four elements earth, air, water, fire and Bhutatva is present in Akasha but not Murtatva; 4. Anavastha i.e. universality can not be visualized to be as inhering in further universality as this would lead us to an infinite regress;5. Rupahani, i.e. ultimate differences of objects cannot have further principle of unity as it would contradict their essential nature and their mutual difference would annihilate and finally is ;6. Asambandha i.e. universal is inherent in its individual or particular and thus the thing in which nothing can inhere, can not be a substratum of the universal. In other words nothing can be conceived as inhering 'inherence'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Tarkapanchanana, ed. and Tr By A.E Gough, (I.ii) E.J Lazarus and Co. Banaras, 1873, p.3.

It would not be wrong to remark as an observation that Mimasaka's especially Kumarila's theory of Bhedbheda rests upon their perception of the relation between the Universals and Paritculars as that of Tadatmaya and not of Samavaya. Akriti has been accepted by both the Naiyayikas and the Mimasakas as a principle of configuration and differs from Jati for the latter school as Akrti leads us to assume Jati.

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